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INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
un organS focuS on ParalyzIng 
debt cauSed by “Vulture fundS”
The United Nations (UN) International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ordered 
the release of the ARA Libertad, an 
Argentine naval ship, on December 15, 
2012. A Ghanaian court impounded the 
ARA Libertad in October 2012 at the 
behest of the “vulture fund” NML Capital, 
a subsidiary of the U.S.-based investment 
firm Elliot Capital Management. NML 
Capital sought to hold the ship as leverage 
to secure partial payment of a debt that 
NML argues Argentina owes it following 
NML’s purchase of Argentinian debt, at a 
fraction of its face value, one year before 
Argentina’s $100 billion (USD) default. 
Though a majority of Argentina’s creditors 
accepted repayment at a lower rate, NML 
Capital refused to accept the debt repay-
ment deal offered by Argentina. Instead, 
NML Capital sued Argentina for the full 
face value of the debt. The actions of vul-
ture funds, like NML Capital, have come 
under increased scrutiny by development 
and human rights advocates, leading, in 
the situation of the United Kingdom and 
the Channel Island of Jersey, to legislation 
preventing the vulture funds from seeking 
excessive claims against heavily indebted 
countries. These companies undermine 
debt relief efforts that, in turn, lead to the 
deprivation of human rights.
“Vulture funds” are companies that go 
after both private and sovereign debt during 
periods of crisis, when the debt is available 
at a fraction of its face value. Regarding 
sovereign debt, the African Development 
Bank found that, on average, vulture funds 
collect three to twenty times their invest-
ment. The companies purchase debt with 
the explicit goal of seeking repayment at 
face value and rebuff any attempt by the 
indebted state to renegotiate. Vulture funds 
often force repayment of sovereign debt by 
utilizing foreign courts to secure verdicts 
against the debtor state. For example, the 
U.S.-based FG Hemisphere paid $3.3 mil-
lion (USD) for a thirty-year-old debt owed 
by the former state of Zaire to the former 
state of Yugoslavia. FG Hemisphere then 
sued the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Zaire’s successor state, in the courts of the 
Channel Island of Jersey for $100 million 
(USD). FG Hemisphere initially secured a 
judgment ordering Congo to pay the $100 
million (USD), but a higher court later 
overturned the judgment. According to 
the World Bank, the top 26 vulture funds 
have already collected $1 billion (USD) 
from the world’s poorest states and the 
International Monetary Fund states that 
vulture funds are currently seeking another 
$1.47 billion (USD).
Cephas Lumina, the United Nations 
Independent Expert on foreign debt and 
human rights, recently expressed concern 
about the negative impact of vulture funds 
on the realization of human rights. Lumina 
cautioned governments about allowing 
vulture funds to “paralyze debt relief for 
heavily indebted countries.” Pointing out 
the connection between debt and human 
rights, Lumina said that “reduced debt bur-
dens and increased fiscal capacity contrib-
ute to the creation of the conditions neces-
sary for the realization of all human rights, 
particularly economic, social and cultural 
rights.” Vulture funds have also come to 
the attention of the full Human Rights 
Council. In June 2012, the UN Human 
Rights Council (the Council) endorsed 
the UN Guiding Principles on Foreign 
Debt and Human Rights (the Principles). 
Vulture funds’ failure to negotiate debt 
with the debtor state contravenes two of 
these principles. First, the Principles state: 
“[L]oan agreements should impose clear 
restrictions on the sale or assignment of 
debts to third parties by creditors with-
out the prior informed consent of the 
Borrower State concerned. Every effort 
must be directed towards achieving a nego-
tiated settlement between the creditor and 
the debtor.” Second, the Principles state: 
“[C]reditors should not sell sovereign debt 
on the secondary market to creditors that 
have previously refused to participate in 
agreed debt restructuring.” In its resolution 
adopting the Principles, the Council stated 
that the obligation to protect individuals’ 
human rights from vulture funds extends 
beyond the duty of private actors to refrain 
from actions that undermine human rights. 
As the Council affirmed, “the activities 
of vulture funds highlight some of the 
problems in the global financial system 
and are indicative of the unjust nature of 
the current system,” and it called on States 
to address the issue.
As the Human Rights Council made 
clear, states have an obligation to rein in 
a business model that is fundamentally at 
odds with efforts to reduce debt burdens 
and better ensure human rights. And, with 
vulture funds currently circling around 
another $1.47 billion (USD), the realiza-
tion of the UN Guiding Principles on 
Foreign Debt and Human Rights could 
provide a welcome reprieve to states in 
need of debt relief.
un workIng grouP urgeS a 
bIndIng accountabIlIty mechanISm 
for PrIVate mIlItary and SecurIty 
comPanIeS
Recent comments by a UN Working 
Group focused on private military and 
security companies (PMSCs) highlight 
the continuing need for an international 
convention to ensure that PMSCs respect 
international human rights and humanitar-
ian law. PMSCs are a force and a control 
tool used by both state and non-state 
actors. Though PMSCs appear to be the 
modern mercenary, they do not necessarily 
fall under the narrow definition of merce-
nary articulated in Article 47 of Protocol I 
of the Geneva Conventions and Article 1 
of the International Convention against the 
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training 
of Mercenaries (which also criminalizes 
them). PMSCs operate in a variety of 
capacities formally viewed as the exclu-
sive role of government, including com-
bat, domestic policing, drug eradication, 
and post-conflict reconstruction. Private 
actors, such as multinational corporations, 
also utilize the services of PMSCs.
Though existing prior to the September 
11, 2001, attack in the United States, 
PMSCs have greatly benefited from 
the United States’s “global war on ter-
ror,” with the industry now taking in an 
estimated $100 billion (USD) annually. 
Human rights concerns over this growing 
phenomenon led the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, in July 2005, to create the 
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Working Group on the use of mercenar-
ies as a means of violating human rights 
and impeding the exercise of the rights of 
peoples to self-determination (Working 
Group). In July 2010, the Working Group 
submitted a draft international conven-
tion on PMSCs for consideration by the 
Human Rights Council. The convention 
would reaffirm that States Parties are 
responsible and should have a monopoly of 
the legitimate use of force, would identify 
certain government functions that can-
not be outsourced to PMSCs, and would 
require States Parties to take measures to 
ensure that PMSCs are held accountable 
for violations of international human rights 
and humanitarian law. In addition to States 
Parties, this convention would also apply 
to intergovernmental organizations. The 
Working Group’s latest country visit to 
Somalia in December 2012 highlights the 
need for this binding convention.
Faiza Patel, the Chairperson of the 
Working Group, called on the Somali 
government to “ensure that private secu-
rity forces are properly regulated and do 
not become a substitute for competent 
and accountable police.” Specifically, the 
Working Group noted concerns over the 
use of armed security on board vessels 
off the coast of Somalia. Though put in 
place to combat “piracy,” Patel found that 
“[t]he lack of regulations for armed 
security on ships and the absence of robust 
reporting for incidents at sea create[s] risks 
for human rights” violations. Concerns 
over the use of private security forces in 
Somalia followed on the heels of an alarm-
ing statement issued by the Working Group 
one year earlier. In a press release, the 
Working Group noted that PMSCs “under-
take an ever-larger range of activities in 
an increasing number of countries around 
the world.” In addition to the increased 
prevalence of PMSCs, the Working Group 
noted how the lack of a clear delinea-
tion between mercenaries and PMSCs can 
negatively impact the realization of human 
rights. Specifically, the Working Group 
referenced the report from its 2011 mis-
sion to Equatorial Guinea that found the 
Equatorial Guinea “coup attempt of March 
2004 . . . clearly involve[d] mercenaries, 
some of whom were employees or former 
employees of private military and security 
companies from several other countries. 
. . . [T]he attempt illustrates the possible 
close and disturbing links between mer-
cenaries and some private military and 
security companies, making the monitor-
ing of such links all the more necessary.” 
Furthermore, the Working Group raised 
concerns over the use of PMSCs to provide 
security for oil infrastructures, as it may 
negatively impact the state’s control over 
its natural resources and hence further 
weaken its ability to control its borders 
and ensure its security. In addition to 
the coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea, 
the past decade was rife with examples 
of human rights abuses carried out by 
PMSCs, including the infamous Nisour 
Square massacre where employees of the 
private PMSC Blackwater (now known as 
Academi) fatally shot seventeen Iraqi civil-
ians. As such, PMSCs, according to the 
Working Group, must no longer operate 
unless measures are put in place to ensure 
accountability.
As the Working Group found, PMSC 
employees have repeatedly committed 
“grave” human rights violations. By par-
tially or fully ceding their monopoly on the 
use of force to PMSCs, states undermine 
their ability and obligation to respect, pro-
tect, and fulfill human rights. But, instead 
of calling for an outright ban on PMSCs, 
the Working Group seeks the creation of 
binding minimal international standards 
that regulate the actions of PMSCs and 
ensure states comply with their obliga-
tions under international human rights and 
humanitarian law.
Frank Knaack, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
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